Sunday 19 June 2011

INDIAN ARMY OF BRITISH RAJ

Indian army was primarily used as a tool of Imperialistic aspirations by the United Kingdom until 1947 and even up to 1950 after independence. At no point of time it was separated from political interferences. All actions were directed  towards the Crown's own interest and record suggests that the Indian army units were also tasked to spy on their respective areas of responsibilities. A monthly or quarterly Intelligence Report used to be submitted by the units giving the complete picture of the area in terms of military, political, economical, social, religious, cultural, etc. activities. All these reports were classified as SECRET and were to submitted to the army headquarters. The army headquarters in tern used to analyse these reports and forward them to the Viceroy's office; they were to be finally used as a reference point in formulating future British policies in India.
I was quite fortunate to see some of the reports while researching for my book at the archives and became more curious as some of them originated from the Auxiliary Force (India) units; India's part-time military organization during the British Raj.
I am reproducing one such report which was originated by the Allahabad Contingent, Auxiliary Force (India). 


SECRET
No. 36 / 109
Headquarters Allahabad Contingent A.F.(I).
10 Hastings Road, Allahabad 10th July 1942.

To,
Chief General Staff
Army Headquarters.
Subject: Intelligence Report

Military.  There has been a certain amount of comment about the failure to find any role for the A.F.(I). to play in Civil Defence. The powers given to District Magistrates under the Defence of India Rules have certainly made the task of A.F.(I). commanders more difficult. Mechanised units find themselves threatened by District Magistrate's power of commandeering the cars of members - or by the refusal of all petrol - thus immobilising them. There seems no plan for the use of the A.F.(I). during internal disturbances which are likely if Mr. Gandhi launches another campaign - and there appears to be every chance of disorganisation if the Civil authorities are allowed to interfere with the A.F.(I). by commandeering cars - refusing petrol supplies for training purposes and claiming A.F.(I). members as A.R.P. Wardens etc. There is very strong held feeling in A.F.(I). circles that they are not wanted and not taken seriously and there is a definite feeling of frustration. Most A.F.(I). members cannot understand why all Europeans and Anglo Indians are not compelled to belong to the A.F.(I). It is not too late yet to do this and train these very useful recruits. The example of the 'Khaki Risala' of the Mutiny in restoring order in the districts should not be forgotten and value of mechanised light motor patrols should not be lost sight of. It is more than likely there will be a need for them in view of the spirit of Congress or part of Congress to pull down the roof on top of us all and in view of the loss of prestige which our defeats in Malay, Burma and now Libya have undoubtedly caused. The attack on the Shimla Kalka mail motor was a portent. We should certainly reorganise our A.F.(I). and make service in it compulsory. The  numbers in this unit are now reduced to 38 in the U.P. Horse and 18 in the Allahabad Rifles. Larger numbers have left to join regular units or have been embodied to serve as telephone orderlies in brigade and area offices. It is question whether it is any longer worthwhile keeping up so small unit and especially after the issue of Defence Department letter no. 6700-A/D6 of June 2. It is little use training men to take their place in a unit if when wanted they are not available. Unless all fit European and Anglo Indians are compelled to join the A.F.(I).- It would be wiser to disband them - before they disband themselves by the natural process of enlistment in other units or forces. There is always a disposition for A.R.P. services to be regarded as superior and more important. Civil officers do not consider the A.F.(I). of any value and do not take it into consideration. The Director General, Civil Defence of the Province told me the other day that the A.F.(I). was no use and A.R.P. was much more important; yet it could be made into a most useful force if all were made to belong as they should be.

Political.  The statement of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru published on the expansion of the Viceroys Council has been attributed by a well informed Muslim to a worsening of relations between the so called 'Moderates' and Government. He had noticed this in Cawnpore among the commercial element who seemed to be more inclined to carp. Part of this attitude is due to the defeat in Libya as these commercial circles are very sensitive to suggestions that they may be backing the wrong horse. On the other hand the statement is believed by some to be coloured by the views of his son Mr. P.N. Sapru M.L.C. , a somewhat cantankerous and disgruntled critic of everything British. He himself has no following and is disappointed. There is a feeling in educational circles that something should be done to harness the enthusiasm of youth which at present has little outlet. A scheme to improve physical training in schools has been greatly extended by the setting up of up to date gymnasia in high schools and the training of masters to teach agility exercise. This is having a good effect but more is wanted. A scheme on the lines of the A.T.S. in England would have a great influence - and undoubtedly if the organisation could be got up a cadet corps in the larger institutions would help a lot to canalise activities which undirected tend to undesirable ends.
Much speculation exist as to Mr. Gandhi's next move. On the whole it does not seem that the Congress organisation in the United Provinces is as strong as it was and doubts are expressed as to whether many would follow him in an aggressive policy - but local discontents would certainly be exploited. There is still a fairly general feeling that the Japanese would not be so bad as masters. This needs to be remembered. Indian evacuees from Burma are stated to be of a distinctly defeatist frame of mind and their influence has not been good.

Signed
Lt. Col.
Commanding The Allahabad Contingent A.F.(I).

Copy to :- Headquarters Allahabad Area.

Copyright Material: Reproduced with permission from the National Archives of India, Government of India, New Delhi
(Published by the team of TERRITORIALS)